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TREKKING TOWARD ÜBER REGULATION: PROSPECTS FOR
MEANINGFUL CHANGE AT SEC ENFORCEMENT?
Douglas M. Branson*
“Once the guardian of the nation’s capital markets, known as an efficient
regulator with a highly respected enforcement program, the [SEC] is now the
subject of much criticism and is mired in scandal.”  Ralph Nader, a critic of1
government regulation in all its forms, once rated the SEC as the best agency
in Washington, head and shoulders above any competitor.  Today, those in the2
securities industry seem to exhibit little fear of the agency and enforcement
actions by it. Major scandals (Bernard Madoff, R. Allen Stanford, WestView
Capital) go undetected (at least by the SEC) for years or decades, finally
unraveling with billions of dollars in investor losses, leaving the SEC only to
sweep up and turn out the lights.  It seems each year, one or more major3
securities-related scandals has unfolded, undeterred in its formative stages by
the prospect of SEC action; at full flower, these scandals may be policed and
detected by state attorneys general, state securities commissions, or private
plaintiffs, but almost never by the SEC.4
There now swirl about us countless proposals for regulatory reform.5
Certain of the proposals are international, indeed global, in scope. The G-20
meeting, held here in Pittsburgh in September 2009, raised a unified hue and
cry by all the participating nations that regulatory actions be taken to avert the
near-death experience visited upon economies of the world over in 2008–09.6
546 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:545
7. Über is a German word whose literal meaning is “over” or “above.” COLLINS GERMAN
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8. See SEC Must Remain Independent, State Pension Funds Urge Geithner, 41 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA), at 1007 (June 1, 2009).
9. In a $3.6 billion bonus case, the SEC had charged Bank of America (BofA) with a misleading
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shareholders to believe that Merrill would not pay bonuses when, in fact, it had already paid billions. The
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proffered settlement, finding that the very shareholders who had been misled would pay the settlement and
that the proposed settlement “does not comport with even the most elementary notions of justice and
morality.” Kara Scannell, Liz Rappaport & Jess Bravin, Judge Tosses Out Bonus Deal, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 15, 2009, at A1; Editorial, Rakoff Rakes the SEC, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, at A20. The episode
“puts new pressure on the agency to show that it is fighting for investors . . . .” Scannell, supra. To some
it was indicative of worse than a lack of fight: “That doesn’t restore your reputation very well. They were
hoping to slip a quick and dirty settlement past the judge and got called on it.” Kara Scannell, BofA Ruling
Questions an SEC Weapon, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2009, at C3 (comment of Professor Peter Henning).
Every proposal put forward has a common ingredient: an inexorable trend
toward bigness. The U.S. government would reach for bigness in at least two
ways. One is the merger of existing agencies and commissions, usually to be
followed by conflation of the new larger agencies’ jurisdictional reach.
Second is the creation and empowerment of new über regulators,  exercising7
oversight over vast sectors of economic activity while perhaps further
assuming some front-line responsibilities.
Thus far the SEC has escaped all of this. Early suggestions for a merger
of the SEC with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) seem
to have faded.  Instead, led by SEC Chair Mary Schapiro, the Commission has8
undertaken a number of new regulatory initiatives and tried to impart a new
tone at the top, particularly in enforcement.
The purpose of this essay is to describe some of these developments, tease
out the pros and cons of the march toward bigness, and to evaluate this overall
trend. The conclusion? The principal problem is that the SEC has now become
the last fire truck to arrive at the scene of the fire, when not too long ago it
was leading the charge. Many times the SEC fire truck arrives at the fire not
at all. Other times, it arrives, but late and behind the wheel of a dinky little fire
truck, ill-equipped to extinguish the fire; limping along in this fashion, the
Commission is disrespected further and even ignored by Wall Street, not to
mention federal judges.  Nothing in the trend toward bigness, and only9
tangentially a few items in the SEC program of specific regulatory reforms,
addresses the predicament in which the SEC finds itself. How once again to
become the first responder, the first fire truck on the scene, respected by all,
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admired by some, feared by many, and able once again to gain the confidence
of the public and to project a level of deterrence that will put an end to the
greed and recklessness that has characterized this decade?
I. THE PROPOSALS
A. The Proposed Paulson Reforms
Hank Paulson, former CEO of the large and highly profitable financial
services firm Goldman Sachs, served as Secretary of the Treasury under
President George W. Bush. In March 2008, Secretary Paulson fired the first
salvo, publishing a white paper that promoted the Federal Reserve as an über
regulator, “in effect allowing it to send SWAT teams into any corner of the
industry or institution that might pose a risk to the overall system.”  The Bush10
administration said that “the Federal Reserve should be given sweeping new
powers to protect the integrity of the financial system, contending that market
turmoil had exposed a badly outdated regulatory system.”  More recently,11
Citigroup founder Sanford Weill floated a very similar proposal: “Make the
Federal Reserve the super-regulator responsible for overseeing systemic risk.
It is vital that one regulator be able to see the entire balance sheet of the
country’s largest financial institutions. . . . Large banks, securities firms,
insurers and hedge funds should all come under the Fed’s aegis.”12
B. Ex-SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt’s Views
Chairman Pitt took to the hustings in early 2009, offering views that the
existing regulatory system is “badly broken” and that “an extensive overhaul
is in order.”  According to the Chairman, repairing the regulatory system in13
the area of finance is “critical and necessary.” In 1998–99, when Congress had
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14. See Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., N.Y., 295 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing synthetics
generally).
15. Administration Regulatory Overhaul Would Concentrate Many New Powers at Fed, 41 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1137 (June 22, 2009) [hereinafter Regulatory Overhaul]. During the financial
meltdown, of course, many formerly financial firms such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs had
become banks so that they could have access to borrowings from the Federal Reserve.
an opportunity to do so, Congress did not modernize the regulatory patchwork.
In enacting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Congress rescinded the Glass-
Steagall Act, permitting commercial banks headlong entry into a financial
arena occupied by investment banks; at the same time, though, Congress failed
to fill in any of the crevices, such as regulation of new derivative products and
synthetic derivatives,  and in fact forbade the SEC to regulate in those areas.14
As a result, while banks could offer one-stop shopping across a broad and
expanding array of financial products and services, regulation remained a
“patchwork” consisting of various agencies regulating various areas, with
many areas not regulated at all. Chairman Pitt’s guidelines for regulatory
reform included:
• The SEC must revamp its compliance surveillance.
• Government must enhance its risk management capabilities in all
financial areas.
• Government has to ensure that regulatory agencies have the authority
and the responsibility to regulate all new financial products.
The best way to achieve these aims? The President and the Congress should
create an über regulator so that no cracks or crevices would exist any longer.
C. President Obama’s Proposals
When they emerged, the Administration’s proposals pulled the punch that
had been anticipated. No merger of the SEC and other agencies, such as the
CFTC, would occur. No full-blown über regulator would emerge. Instead, a
front-line regulator, the Federal Reserve, would assume overall supervision,
presumably including risk management, for large financial firms (Tier 1
Financial Holding Companies, or FHCs) of whatever stripe (commercial
banks, investment banks, brokerage firms).  The Office of Thrift Supervision15
(formerly the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) would cease to exist, merging
with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (an agency within Treasury
which regulates national banks) to form the first of two partial über regulators
(some über, some front-line responsibility), the National Bank Supervisor. A
second partial über regulator, the Commercial Financial Protection Agency,
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Obama Lists Key Principles for Reform of Nation’s Financial Regulatory System, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA), at 335 (Mar. 2, 2009).
18. See, e.g., Administration Sees Expanded SEC Role in Proposed Financial Regulatory Regime,
41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1139 (June 22, 2009).
19. Damian Paletta, Finance Reforms Pared Back, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2009, at A1.
20. Id. at A4.
would assume oversight over issuance of and collections on credit cards,
mortgage banking, and similar affairs.  Last of all, a Financial Services16
Oversight Council, chaired by the Secretary of Treasury and with its own full-
time staff within Treasury, would preside. Membership would include the
chiefs of the financial regulatory agencies (SEC, CFTC, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the new
National Bank Supervisor, and the new Consumer Financial Protection
Agency). Among its principal tasks, the Council would designate which firms
ought to be classified as Tier 1 FHCs and thus subject to Federal Reserve
oversight.17
The SEC actually emerged with expanded powers, including
recommendations that the SEC have power to impose fiduciary as well as
suitability standards on brokers, serve as the conservator or receiver when the
largest subsidiary of a failing financial firm is a broker-dealer or securities
firm, and give expanded protection to whistle-blowers in the financial field.18
Matter-of-fact appraisals portrayed the Administration as “backing away
from seeking a major reduction in the number of agencies overseeing the
financial markets . . . . [Administration officials now] expect to call for most
existing agencies to have broader powers . . . .”  Rather than creating new19
larger regulators and an additional layer of oversight, officials sought to “fill
gaps between agencies and eliminate overlaps.”  Experienced pundits termed20
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23. A push for an über regulator for investments reemerged as well, with SEC Commissioner Luis
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See Aguilar Expressly Supports Single Regulator, Urges SEC, CTFC to Combine with DOL Entity, 41 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1053 (June 8, 2009).
24. Stephen Labaton, Leading Senator Pushes New Plan to Oversee Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2009, at A1.
25. Id.
the SEC “a winner” in the Administration proposals, which praised the SEC
as “an experienced federal supervisor.”21
D. Senator Dodd and Related Proposals
A commercial bank, or its equivalent, may be regulated by the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, or a state Department
of Banking or Department of Financial Institutions. Startup organizations
could and did seek out the cracks and crevices in the system so as to escape
regulatory oversight. “It never made sense that a credit-card product offered
by Chase was overseen by one regulator according to one set of standards,
while a virtually identical product offered by a competitor would be overseen
by a completely different regulator according to different standards.”22
So the push for an über regulator, or at least one for banks, re-emerged.23
All institutions, “wherever they’re regulated,” including “sectors of the
financial system that have long fallen outside the scope of any agency,” will
come under one large banking agency. In the Congress, the über banking
regulator’s standard-bearer became Senator Christopher Dodd, who chairs the
Senate Banking Committee and who introduced legislation to roll the
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, FDIC, and Federal
Reserve into one.  Mr. Dodd says that “the market crisis last year was caused24
in part by banks that were able to choose which agency would regulate them
and by bank agencies that reduced regulations to encourage more banks to
choose them.”  Über appeared to be becoming über once again.25
The Dodd plan is likely to receive sharp resistance from banking industry
lobbyists who wish to preserve as much of the current system as they can and
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27. David A. Moss, An Ounce of Prevention: Financial Regulation, Moral Hazard, and the End
of “Too Big to Fail,” HARVARD MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2009, 25, 26–27 (According to Moss, “the biggest
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with it the advantages for regulatory arbitrage, which at the extreme critics
dub “the race for the bottom.” The Dodd plan would provide for a consumer
financial protection agency, as would the Obama plan, but would significantly
reduce the Federal Reserve’s role.26
E. Big on Big Proposals
Certain knowledgeable observers take these proposals several steps
further, advocating bigness for bigness’s sake. We need big tough regulators
to take on the bigger, ofttimes incorrigible financial institutions, some of
which have grown to gargantuan size:
[T]he assets of the nation’s security brokers and dealers increased from $45 billion
(1.6 percent of gross domestic product) in 1980 to $262 billion (4.5 percent of GDP)
in 1990 to more than $3 trillion (22 percent of GDP) in 2007. [B]ear Stearns saw its
assets increase from about $37 billion in 1999 to nearly $400 billion at the start of
2007; and the behemoth Citigroup . . . grew its balance sheet from less than $700
billion at the start of 1999 to more than $2 trillion by 2007! The rise of massive
institutions represented a profound change in our financial system and a powerful
new source of systemic risk. Yet we didn’t update our regulatory policies in response
. . . .27
F. Chairman Frank Arrives on the Scene
Representative Barney Frank, as Chair of the House Financial Services
Committee, has concentrated on the trading and regulation of derivative
products. The Obama administration wanted all derivatives, which in the
financial crisis resulted in the concentration rather than the hedging of risk, to
be traded on an exchange or a recognized electronic trading platform.
Financial institutions say that certain financial products are not widely traded
enough to be on exchanges; many of these products are essential to the
management of risk by these front-line firms. In response, Representative
Frank has written legislation softening the mandate that products be
standardized and traded on exchanges. Officials at the SEC and the CFTC
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(BNA), at 1856 (Oct. 12, 2009).
29. Len Boselovic & Elwin Green, G-20 Leaders Eager to Regulate Banking Executives’ Pay,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 25, 2009, at A4.
30. Cindy Skrzycki, G-20 Leaders Likely to Fault Sluggish Financial Reform in U.S., PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 25, 2009, at A6.
31. Damian Paletta & Deborah Solomon, Geithner Vents as Overhaul Stumbles, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 4, 2009, at A1.
reacted by publicly stating that Chairman Frank’s carve-outs are too
generous.28
G. International Developments
The European Union Commission has completed draft legislation that
would provide for a pan-European über regulator. The European Systemic
Risk Board would be charged with detection of risks in the financial systems
of 27 countries, issuing warnings and prescriptions for corrective actions.29
G-20 leaders discussed “how to get banks to fatten their capital cushions and
limit leverage of that capital,” seemingly sounding a prelude for yet another
über regulator proposal.30
II. ON BIGNESS
A. Progress
Thus far, proposals for a hydra-headed über regulator have made little
progress. This has led to reports of tantrums by the Treasury Secretary:
“Secretary Timothy Geithner blasted top U.S. financial regulators in an
expletive-laced critique last Friday as frustration grows over the Obama
administration’s faltering plan to overhaul U.S. financial regulation . . . .”31
What seems to hamstring the proposals’ progress is the difficulty of reaching
around them or, indeed, even around several of the regulatory agencies being
proposed. In that sense, “big” may be a disadvantage.
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33. See, e.g., Charles Forelle, Microsoft Yields to EU on Web Browsers, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2009,
at B1.
34. Interview with Larry H. Summers, Chair, President’s National Economic Council, in Maria
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B. The Advantages of Big
1. Meet Force with like Force: Big Institutions Need Big Powerful
Regulators
A global trend exists toward bigness. Multinational corporations strive to
be number one, two or perhaps three in their core competencies, not on a
regional, national or pan-national (European Union or similar) scale, but on
a global basis.  The Microsoft antitrust case is instructive. Microsoft used its32
monopoly over the basic operating system (Windows) to force original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to install Microsoft’s web browser,
Explorer, rather than the first widely used browser by Netscape. Often using
bare knuckles, Microsoft rapidly went from 3 to 97 percent domestic market
share.
For an antitrust violation to exist, the would-be violator must have a
monopoly on the tying product, here the basic system. Whether they have a
monopoly depends upon how the relevant geographic market is defined. If the
market is only a national one (300 million persons), Microsoft probably
engaged in an illicit practice.  On the other hand, if the market is a global one33
(6.3 billion persons), Microsoft must engage in some of these practices if it is
to compete on the world stage. “Think Global,” “Get Big Fast,” “The Earth Is
Flat.” Why should regulatory agencies be any different?
2. With Big Über Regulators, Gaps or Crevices No Longer Exist, So
Opportunities for Regulatory Arbitrage Are Minimized, or Eliminated
Altogether
With one big regulator over commercial and investment banks,
“[i]nstitutions aren’t going to be able to play one regulator off against another
the way they have in the past.”  In fact, certain of the players, such as34
Washington Mutual and Countrywide Mortgage, have “flipped their charters
to escape regulation by the Fed” and, in certain instances, any meaningful
regulation at all. “The new empowerment of the Fed will bring the U.S. more
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Sept. 3, 2009, at C3 (remarks of CME CEO Craig Donahue).
into line with international practice, where there is a holistic regulator with
overall responsibility for the systemic risk posed by institutions.”35
C. The Disadvantages of Big
1. If Big Is So Necessary to Counter and Confront Big Banks and Big
Financial Institutions, Why Do the Big Players Seem Unperturbed by (Indeed
Welcoming of) Bigness and the Über Regulator?
Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner is seen as a leading advocate
of “the Wall Street-centric view.”  He unabashedly has promoted bank36
mergers, use of TARP funds for big banks to make acquisitions of other
banks, getting bigger (our nation, according to Secretary Geithner, is “over
banked”), and imposition of an über regulator. “Our system failed in basic
fundamental ways . . . . [T]o address this will require comprehensive reform.
Not modest reform at the margin, but new rules of the game.”37
It appears that big institutions receive lighter treatment from big and
powerful regulators. It is the small guy and the mid-size person who get
steamrollered by the big, bureaucratic regulator. Wall Street institutions know
this. Besides, big regulators can provide them with big infusions of capital.
Citigroup received $45 billion. Bank of America also received $45 billion in
bailout funds.  The large institutions, and those who speak on their behalf,38
welcome bigger über type regulators or, at least, the status quo. “[E]xchanges
and clearing houses should be allowed to choose their regulator,” one
exchange CEO maintained.39
2. Big Would Result in Great Losses of Morale and Esprit De Corps
Possession of dedication, loyalty, and a capacity for hard work that
exceeds that of the staff at any other Washington agency, bar none, has always
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40. See, e.g., Jonathan G. Katz, Reviewing the SEC, Reinvigorating the SEC, 71 U. PITT. L. REV.
489 (2010).
41. The SEC is a surprisingly small agency. As of June 1, 2009 the Commission had 3,652 staff.
Its fiscal year 2010 request was for $1,026 million and its 2011 request was $1,241 million. Its staff size
is much smaller than, say, the FDIC, which has more than 5,000 employees. SEC Seeks Significant Increase
in Funding for FY 2010, 2011, Citing Staffing Shortage, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1049 (June 8,
2009).
42. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59748 (Apr. 10, 2009)
(modified uptick rule release).
43. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60388 (July 27, 2009) (fail to
deliver release).
44. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-8177, 34-47235 (Mar. 3, 2003).
been a hallmark of the SEC. As 5:00 p.m. approaches, most government
agencies empty faster than a grammar school on a spring day. At the SEC, as
6:30 p.m. or even 7:00 p.m. approaches, half the staff is still working at their
desks. Traditionally, at least, SEC rank-and-file have fervor for what they do.
That fervor, dedication, loyalty, and esprit de corps, what some have termed
part of “the DNA of the agency,”  would be lost should the SEC be40
consolidated with other agencies.  On information and belief, the CFTC,41
which is a smaller agency yet, has a reputation for having high levels of
morale and fervor.
In all of this quest for reform, no person in authority has raised even the
possibility that mergers and the formation of an über regulator may entail
lasting and significant intangible costs in terms of loss of spirit and morale.
3. Big Regulators Produce Large Quantities of Vapid and Turgid “Bloat”
The SEC is already infected with this problem. In days of yore, as a small
and efficient agency, the Commission promulgated three and five-page
releases. They left numerous “fruitful ambiguities,” to be worked out over
time, or not worked out at all.
Things have changed. One recent release, on possible adoption of a
modified uptick rule applicable to short selling, contained 243 pages, replete
with 266 footnotes.  A follow-on release, requiring broker-dealers to close42
fails to deliver, mainly by short-selling clients, had 100 pages.  Following43
adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which required that at least one member
of a public company’s audit committee be a “financial expert,” the SEC
devoted a 63-page release to this relatively simple topic, when two or three
pages surely would have sufficed.  In lengthening its pronouncements, the44
SEC is substituting plain ambiguity for fruitful ambiguity, largely a
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counterproductive effort. Much more of the same will come with big über
regulators.
4. Existence off Big Über Regulators Will Conflate the Expectations Gap,
Already Too Big as it Is
Politicians today do not stand up and declare that government cannot
solve this problem, or that problem, or all problems. They lead the citizenry
to believe that government can be all things to all people. So do regulators. So
does the mere existence of large and, inferentially, all-powerful regulatory
agencies.  Among the myriad proposals for über regulators in the financial45
area, “[t]he biggest danger of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency is . . .
that giving products a government imprimatur can make people feel safer than
they really are. (The economist Kip Viscusi has termed this type of problem
the ‘lulling effect.’).”  But it is worse than that. Instead of lulling, the creation46
of a big, supposedly all-powerful agency creates affirmative expectations that
government can bail anyone out of almost any problem. Rather than a new
regulator, “it would do well to teach consumers a simple lesson: if you don’t
understand the deal you’re making, don’t make it.”47
III. IF BIG IS NOT THE ANSWER, ARE DISCRETE IMPROVEMENTS
TO ENFORCEMENT?
A. No Über Regulator
SEC Chair Mary Schapiro warned the Senate Banking Committee “not
to create a monolithic regulator threatening the authority of her agency and its
mandate over the capital markets.”  Her comments were heard. As has been48
seen,  none of the many and widely differing über regulator proposals49
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51. Id. at 1210.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1211. Of course, a great, although perhaps not insurmountable, inconsistency exists
between the broker-dealer’s traditional role as a salesperson and role as a fiduciary, with duties of the
utmost good faith and loyalty. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT.
L. REV. 439 (2010).
54. Obama Plan, supra note 21, at 1211. The SEC had already reversed itself on the near polar
opposite, namely, no supervision or light supervision of large diversified financial firms. In Fall 2008, after
the failures and near failures of Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch, the SEC terminated its
voluntary supervision (supervision lite) program for “consolidated supervised entities” (CSEs). Id.
included the SEC. Instead, “[t]he Securities and Exchange Commission clearly
has the Administration’s confidence and appears a winner in the opening
phase of the financial services regulatory reorganization,” one commentator
said as a prelude to his observations. He continued: “[t]he Treasury proposal
now praises the SEC as ‘an experienced federal supervisor’ and . . . assigns it
substantial new responsibilities.”  Thus, for the time being, the SEC can put50
back into the closet the prospect of an über regulator towering over or
absorbing the Commission. Accordingly, the time has come to examine
closely the assignment to the Commission of “substantial new
responsibilities” as well as the refurbishment of some old ones.
B. Initiatives by or for the SEC
The Obama administration wants all standardized derivatives to be traded
on exchanges or cleared through the mechanisms of electronic trading
platforms where they would be subject to robust margin and record-keeping
requirements.  Presently, such transactions often go unreported, even to the51
extent of taking place in back rooms. As part of the Administration’s
proposals, the Treasury wants to require that hedge funds and private equity
firms register with the SEC pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act.  Closer52
to enforcement, the proposed Treasury reforms would require the
classification of registered representatives as fiduciaries in all cases, not
merely when the broker had held herself out as being such.  The SEC could53
in effect (by a four out of five commissioner vote) put broker-dealer
subsidiaries of large financial firms into involuntary “resolution” proceedings
in which the SEC would be the conservator or receiver.  Another plank in the54
new platform would involve revoking the 10-day rule, under which broker-
dealers could vote “street name” shares if beneficial owners had failed to vote,
in part on the grounds that brokers never properly analyzed the issues, blindly
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55. Sarah Lynch, SEC Plan Aims to Better Foretell Risks, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2009, at C3.
56. Kara Scannell, “Urgency” Drives SEC Crackdown, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2009, at C1
(reporting comments of new SEC enforcement chief Robert Khuzami).
57. Id.
58. These and other steps to bolster enforcement are also reviewed in detail by Professor Jayne
Barnard. See generally Jayne Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403 ( 2010).
59. See, e.g., The SEC’s Blueprint to Reinvigorate Enforcement, 41 Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA), at 671 (Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Blueprint] (presently the duty officer or commissioners in
seriatim may authorize a formal order allowing staff to use the agency’s subpoena power).
60. Enforcement Division to Tighten Processes; Penalty Guidance, Manual are Under Review, 41
Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 805 (May 4, 2009).
61. See Blueprint, supra note 59, at 669 (paraphrasing testimony of Chairperson Schapiro before
the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
voting with corporate management in most cases.  These and other proposed55
reforms would widen and deepen SEC jurisdiction but they only impinge upon
enforcement. Strictly speaking, these reforms would be adjuncts to
enforcement rather than enforcement itself.
C. Reforms to Bring Back “A Sense of Urgency” to SEC Enforcement56
SEC Chair Mary Schapiro wants to put in place a number of measures
that will make the agency’s enforcement staff “more fleet-footed.”  Steps the57
SEC has taken or proposes to take include the following:58
• Returning Subpoena Power to the Staff from the Commission. Under
Chairman Christopher Cox, attorneys had to seek authority from the
full Commission before being able to sign and serve official
discovery requests. The resulting delay caused considerable down
time, or even dead time, in securities fraud investigations or other
proceedings. One of Commission Chair Mary Schapiro’s first
reforms was to abolish the practice.59
• Eliminating Extensions of Time for Wells Submissions. A would-be
defendant who has been a party to an SEC investigation is given a
formal opportunity to present its side of the case, showing why it
should not be sued. “The process will tighten up by quite a bit” under
the new regime.  No extensions of time will be granted to putative60
defendants and their attorneys.
• Seeking the Authority to Be Able to Pay Bounties to Whistle
Blowers. Presently, the SEC may only pay bounties, limited to 10
percent, in insider trading cases. Chair Mary Schapiro wants to
broaden the Commission’s authority considerably.  The SEC61
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(noting that in 2008 the IRS received 476 submissions, blowing the whistle on 1,246 taxpayers, but that
under the program overall, after three years no whistle-blower had yet to receive a cent). Another
complicating factor is that the SEC receives approximately 700,000 tips and referrals per year. See
Blueprint, supra note 59, at 669.
63. Teicher v. SEC, 177 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1999), holds that the SEC had no authority to seek
wider bar orders. Previously, the Commission had tried to erect such bars. See Matter of Westerfield,
Exchange Act Release No. 34, 41126, 54 SEC Docket 25 (Mar. 1, 1999).
64. See Obama Plan, supra note 21, at 1212.
65. Kara Scannell, SEC to Give Attorneys More Power, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2009, at C3; Khuzami
Cites Move to Specialized Teams, Other Initiatives to Improve SEC Enforcement, 41 Fed. Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA), at 849 (May 11, 2009).
program would model itself after the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
program, authorized by the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006.
Under the program, the IRS may pay whistle-blowers from 15 to 30
percent of the amount the IRS has recovered.62
• Obtaining Collateral Bars That Would Foreclose to Wrongdoing
Professionals All Aspects of the Securities Business. Under the
existing scheme, SEC attorneys may obtain bar orders against
securities professionals only in those business areas in which those
professionals have been engaged (for example, a bar as to broker-
dealer activity would not bar future affiliation with an investment
adviser or a private equity firm).  The Administration proposal is for63
legislation granting the SEC authority to seek broader bars.64
• Forming Specialized Investigative and Litigation Teams Within the
Enforcement Division. There are now five units with specialized
responsibilities for the following areas:
1. Asset Management Companies.
2. Market Abuse (including insider trading).
3. Structured and New Products (such as credit default
swaps).
4. Bribery of Foreign Officials.
5. Municipal Securities and Public Pension Fund Wrongdoing
(including “pay-to-play” allegations).65
Allocation of staff to preexisting teams, with resources pre-allocated
to them, will make for much quicker response times.
• Granting the SEC Staff Authority to Negotiate Civil Penalties
without First Obtaining Commission Authorization. SEC-levied civil
penalties had grown to $800 million in 2003. Then-SEC Chair
Christopher Cox instituted a policy that staff would have to seek
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at 307 (Feb. 23, 2009).
67. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 45, at 1142 (the SEC hit “its apotheosis in the campaign
against Wall Street insiders like Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken”).
68. In 2008, the SEC Enforcement Division brought 671 enforcement actions, its second highest
total on record. The highest total was 679 in 2003, ballooned by financial reporting scandals following
Enron and WorldCom. Insider trading prosecutions increased 25 percent and market manipulation cases
45 percent, albeit from a very small number. In particular, the SEC trumpeted its settlements with the largest
financial services firms in the auction rate securities cases. FY ‘08 Saw 671 Enforcement Actions, SEC
Reports; Is Second Highest Number, 40 Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1751 (Oct. 27, 2008). These
statistics came from a draft of the SEC’s annual Performance and Accountability Review, which it has
published each November since 2004.
from the full Commission a range, or a collar around, possible
penalties before the staff could enter into negotiations with a
wrongdoer. Thereafter, penalties dropped precipitously to: $637
million in 2006, $310 million in 2007, and $96 million in 2008. SEC
Chairperson Schapiro revoked the Cox policy: SEC staff can enter
into negotiations straightaway, without a detour to consult with
commissioners.66
These then are certain of the actions taken or proposed to make the SEC
quicker on its feet, able to react, and even be proactive in a greater number of
cases and matters. They are all laudatory. Many go to reducing reaction time,
which had become sclerotic under previous administrations, with restraints
placed on enforcement as matters of political expediency. But do they attempt
resolution, head-on, of the principal ailment which bedevils securities law
enforcement?
IV. THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM AND EVIDENCE OF IT
A view widely held is that SEC enforcement peaked in the
Shad/Ruder/Breeden era of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Statistics, which67
abound and seem to signal renewed vigor at enforcement, do not tell the real
story.  That story is that since the early 1990s SEC enforcement has lost68
much or, indeed, most of its in terrorem (deterrent) effect. Short of a broad-
based attitudinal study, and perhaps not even then, direct evidence cannot be
gathered.
Indirect evidence, however, is plentiful. The evidence shows that in this
new century major securities scandals unfold each and every year, sometimes
two or three times per year. This never happened in the Twentieth Century.
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There seems to be no effective curb on greed, indeed, unbridled greed. Some
of those scandals, and the reactions to them, include:
• The late-day trading and stale price arbitrage scandals of the mutual
fund industry. These abuses involved investment companies allowing
favored investors, many of which were hedge funds, to enter buy and
sell orders after computation of the net asset value (NAV) and the
close of business each day. The Massachusetts Attorney General and
Securities Commissioner, and not the SEC, played a leading role in
discovering these frauds that involved, among others, Putnam Funds,
headquartered in the Bay State.
• Research analysts-underwriter conflicts of interest. In days gone by,
securities firm research analysts earned adequate but relatively
modest wages. When Wall Street hype of individual stocks,
including many technology stocks, reached new heights, investment
bankers (underwriters) discovered how influential a “buy” or a
“strong buy” rating from the firms’ analysts could be. The
investment bankers began raising the profiles and salaries of research
analysts, particularly influential ones such as Mary Meeker or Jack
Grubman. Grubman actually attended WorldCom board of directors
meetings. He ratcheted up AT&T’s research rating in return for
AT&T CEO Michael Armstrong’s efforts in gaining admission of
Grubman’s twin sons into an elite New York elementary school.
Ultimately, the SEC extracted a $1.4 billion settlement from 10
leading securities firms but the initial charge was led by the then-
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. The SEC rode on the last,
or next-to-last, fire truck.
• Enron, WorldCom and the corporate governance scandals of
2001–02. In the New Yorker, post-Enron, a reviewer pointed out that
in the periodic reports it had filed with the SEC, Enron had made a
complete disclosure of every transaction and step Enron undertook,
albeit in 8-point type, in 50 or so pages of footnotes, buried at the
end of financial statements.  Those revelations added to ammunition69
with which critics maintained that the SEC should have detected
Enron, WorldCom, and similar accounting and governance frauds at
an early point. Of course, traditional securities regulation has never
expected that the SEC would examine and analyze every document
corporations file with the agency. Instead, the mass of company
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corporate officers, principally CEOs, exercised those options. In re Tyson Foods, Inc., Consol. S’holder
Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 572 (Del. Ch. 2007), describes spring loading, a practice through which stock option
committees time the grant of options to corporate executives—typically, before public announcements of
positive developments likely to result in significant increases in the price of the underlying stock. Bullet-
dodging occurs when those in control, sensing that the market has overreacted to negative news and unduly
depressed the company’s share price, quickly grant options to corporate executives, who thereafter have
an inordinately low strike price for the options. Id.
71. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 40, at 489.
72. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES,
GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY 438–43, 468 (2009).
73. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 53, at 439.
periodic report filings constitute a repository that analysts, market
letter authors, and so on, read, digest, analyze, and filter out to a
wider public. Nonetheless, public and many professional
understandings were otherwise. Why didn’t the SEC catch it? The
SEC had the filings in its possession; the agency could have
reviewed them. The corporate governance scandals thus became
another in a line of regulatory failures by the agency, at least in the
minds of the public and of politicians.
• The stock option scandals (backdating, spring loading, bullet
dodging).  Ultimately, the SEC brought 70 or so prosecutions for70
failures to disclose these practices.  Overall, however, nearly 30071
publicly held corporations engaged in these and similar practices.
Rather than the SEC, the plaintiffs’ bar pulled the laboring oar,
bringing derivative actions against companies and the directors who
had permitted the practices to occur.72
• The mutual fund “shelf space” scandals. Trusted broker-dealers such
as Edward D. Jones & Co., were found to have betrayed the trust
their customers historically have placed in them. These retail
brokerage institutions caused their organizations’ registered
representatives to recommend purchase of a select group of mutual
funds based not upon what might be best or suitable for their
customers and their needs. Rather, in return for secret payments and
other benefits, the parent broker-dealer organizations limited
registered representatives in what was available and what they
readily could recommend. The California Attorney General, and not
the SEC, led the unearthing and later prosecution of these illicit shelf
space practices.73
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(quoting ERIN ARVEDLUND, TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE: THE RISE AND FALL OF BERNIE MADOFF (2009)).
• Bonus and executive compensation scandals. The SEC misfired
badly, and incurred the wrath of a prominent federal judge, in its
tepid prosecution of Bank of America in the $3.6 billion Merrill
Lynch bonus coverup.  The Attorney General of New York, Andrew74
Cuomo, not the SEC, undertook a plenary and meaningful
investigation of the matter.  He marched onward after Judge Jed75
Rakoff and the national media publicly called the SEC to account,
further highlighting the SEC’s failures.76
• The never-ending parade of Ponzi schemes, each seemingly larger
than the last. Bernard Madoff stole approximately $15 billion (not
the $65 billion the press has fixated upon) from his investment
adviser clients.  Over the years, the SEC received at least six tips77
that Madoff could not have achieved the financial results he claimed
to have achieved or that he must have in some way been engaged in
a fraudulent scheme. Yet the SEC did nothing.
Charitably, the SEC staff’s failures are understandable. That
anyone, and in particular former NASDAQ president Bernard
Madoff, could have pulled off such a large fraud stretching over so
many years, is far-fetched; and, indeed, it is equally far-fetched that
he wouldn’t have been caught, if not by the SEC, then another
regulator or even a client. That no one caught Madoff at his game is,
among other things, testimony not only to gullibility but also to
affinity fraud.78
Other large far-fetched schemes also had come to light before
the SEC had demonstrated even an inkling. R. Allen Stanford ran a
high yield investment business that garnered over $7 billion in
investors’ capital. Neither the SEC nor the applicable self-regulatory
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organizations heeded warnings, tips, or other indications of what
Stanford may have been doing.79
Not only has the SEC failed to detect or heed warnings and tips
about many of these Ponzi schemes, the Commission and its staff
have permitted other, lesser regulators to steal a march on the SEC
in prosecuting those responsible for these massive frauds.  A80
chronicler of the Madoff episode describes recent years as “one of
the most dysfunctional and inept periods in the Commission’s
history.”81
• The newest investment scandals: the pay-to-play allegations.
CalPERS, the largest public employee pension plan, paid $50 million
to a middleman (also a former director) to funnel investment
proposals to it.  These allegations shed further light on the practices82
of an industry previously in the netherworld, which earned lucrative
fees for presenting investment opportunities to hedge funds, private
equity firms, and pension plans such as CalPERS. Once again, the
SEC was not among the first of the fire trucks to arrive at the scene.
Andrew Cuomo, the Attorney General of New York, prosecuted the
first cases, not the SEC.83
V. CONCLUSION
The SEC is moving in the correct direction. By flattening its
organizational structure, eliminating middle management layers, and pushing
authority down to or toward the front lines, the agency is making itself fleet-
footed, imparting a sense of increased urgency to its enforcement effort. With
proposals for a chief operating officer (COO), the Commission may come
more to replicate the management structure of many large business
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organizations. On the other hand, the Commission must remain wary of any
trend, or renewed trek, toward über regulation. At least as matters now stand,
such a trek would do more harm than good in the securities law enforcement
area.
One further step might involve putting the fire truck nearer where the fire
is likely to be. In other words, the Commission should give thought to a
significant increase in resources and personnel for the New York Regional
Office. Alternatively, the SEC might locate a sizeable strike force of attorneys,
investigators, and staff in New York City, as the Commission once did in Salt
Lake City. Putting sizeable regulatory forces a heartbeat away from Wall
Street and the financial community might decrease or eliminate altogether the
persistent time lag that exists between credible rumors and SEC action. It
would put sets of knowledgeable ears close to the ground, creating and
reinforcing the sense of urgency Chairperson Schapiro and other of the
commissioners want to instill.
Is such a bold move akin to use of a meat clever when the circumstances
call for a scalpel? Mr. Justice Breyer has written that “[m]odesty is desirable
in one’s approach to regulation.”  With regard to the SEC, Professor Adam84
Pritchard writes: “Scandal driven reform . . . has been a recurring pattern in
securities markets . . . . [C]risis, however, does not create the ideal
environment for developing balanced, cost effective policy interventions.”85
Over-regulation decreases American competitiveness. Reform advocates
should prefer a “light touch,” especially in comparison to the bludgeon of
allocated resources this essay suggests.86
How to sort this out? In favor of the bludgeon approach, most of us avoid
risk. On the spectrum of things, though, some of us can tolerate more or,
indeed, much more risk. The latter may be termed “risk preferrers.” Others of
us can tolerate much less risk. This group can be labeled, again on the scale
of things, “risk avoiders.” Studies of the economics of crime and punishment
by Nobel Laureate Gary Becker,  and of antitrust civil and criminal sanctions87
by economists William Breit and Kenneth Elzinga,  demonstrate that the88
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severity of punishment (20-year sentences, large fines) best deters the risk-
avoiding white collar defendant (an accountant, a banker, corporate directors).
By contrast, the probability of detection rather than the severity of punishment
deters the risk preferrer. Numbers of police on the beat deters more the
criminal who sticks up gasoline stations at gun point. The possibility of a
lengthy stretch of jail time barely enters the holdup artist’s head.
Wall Street just went through an epoch of extreme risk. Leverage ratios
(debt to invested capital) rose to 34 or higher at Lehman Brothers and Bear
Stearns, to 32 at Merrill Lynch, and 100 to 1 at Long Term Capital
Management, when at the typical retail or manufacturing company the ratio
of loans to invested capital is approximately decimal .65. Can it be that
individuals we have always thought of as risk avoiders (mangers of many of
our largest financial institutions) are more like the “guys” who stick up gas
stations on a Saturday night? That is, even though many of them wear shirts
with white collars, the denizens of Wall Street are, on the scale of things, risk
preferrers. If so, not severity of punishment but the probability of detection,
greater numbers of SEC “cops” on the beat, will deter them from the practices
we have witnessed over the last several years.
Perhaps now is the time for the General Services Administration (GSA)
to seek out a midsize office building in midtown or downtown Manhattan. The
reason? To house a newly installed posse of SEC enforcement staff.
